Abstract. We consider compositional properties of reactive systems that are secure in a cryptographic sense. We follow the well-known simulatability approach of modern cryptography, i.e., the specification is an ideal system and a real system should in some sense simulate this ideal one. We show that if a system consists of a polynomial number of arbitrary ideal subsystems such that each of them has a secure implementation in the sense of blackbox simulatability, then one can securely replace all ideal subsystems with their respective secure counterparts without destroying the blackbox simulatability relation. We further prove our theorem for universal simulatability by showing that blackbox simulatability implies universal simulatability under reasonable assumptions. We show all our results with concrete security.
Introduction
In recent times, the analysis of cryptographic protocols has been getting more and more attention, and thus the demand for general frameworks for representing cryptographic protocols and their security requirements has been rising. To enable a cryptographically correct analysis of cryptographic protocols, such frameworks have to capture probabilistic behaviors, complexity-theoretically bounded adversaries as well as a reactive environment of the protocol, i.e., continuous interaction with users and an adversary, e.g., in many protocol runs. Clearly, such frameworks further have to be rigorously defined to avoid ambiguities and to enable convincing proofs. Moreover, it is highly desirable that such frameworks provide a link to formal methods, i.e., to tool-supported verification of cryptographic protocols. Tool support can minimize flaws, which occur quite often if the distributed-systems aspects of cryptographic protocols are analyzed by hand. One ingredient for this is that the model should contain an abstract machine model besides Turing machines. The model of Pfitzmann and Waidner [31] is suitable for all these requirements and we use it as a rigorous foundation of this work.
The model of [31] introduced a notion of security-preserving refinement, called reactive simulatability. This notion captures the idea of refinement that preserves not only integrity properties but also confidentiality properties. Intuitively it can be stated as follows, when applied to the relation between a real and an ideal system: 1 Everything that can happen to users of the real system in the presence of an arbitrary adversary A
Asynchronous Reactive Systems
In this section, we review our model for secure reactive systems in an asynchronous network from [31] . Several definitions are only sketched whereas those that are important for understanding our results are given in full detail. All other details can be looked up in the original paper.
General System Model
Systems mainly consist of several interactive machines. Machines communicate via ports (local endpoints for different potential channels) and messages are strings over an alphabet Σ. Inspired by the CSP-Notation [17] , we write output and input ports as q! and q? respectively. As in similar models, channels are defined implicitly by naming convention (and not by a separate graph), that is port q! sends messages to q?. For asynchronous timing, a message is not immediately delivered to its recipient, but first stored in a special machine q called a buffer. If a machine wants to schedule the i-th message of buffer q, it must have the unique clock-out port q ⊳ !, and it sends i at q ⊳ !, see Figure 1 . The buffer then outputs and deletes its i-th message. For a port p, we write p c to denote the port which it connects to according to Figure 1 , i.e., q! c = q ↔ ?, q ↔ ! c = q?, q ⊳ ! c = q ⊳ ? and vice versa. The in-and output ports in a port set or port sequence P are denoted in(P ) and out(P ). Our primary machine model is probabilistic state-transition machines, similar to probabilistic I/O automata as in Lynch [21] (and also essentially in [6, 27] ). If a machine is switched, it receives an input tuple at its input ports and performs its transition function. This yields a new state and an output tuple in the deterministic case, or a finite distribution over such pairs in the probabilistic case. Moreover, each machine has a function bounding the length of the considered inputs; this allows flexible time bounds independent of the environment. 
Definition 1. (Machines) A machine is a tuple
) for all I ∈ I M , where r ⌈ l for l ∈ N,r ∈ Σ * denotes the lsymbol prefix, and the notation is lifted to tuples. We further demand l M (s) = (0, . . . , 0) for every s ∈ Fin M . 3
In the text, we often write "M" for name M . The set (in contrast to the sequence) of ports of a machine M is denoted by ports(M), and similar for sets of machines.
A collectionĈ of machines is a set of machines with pairwise different machine names and disjoint sets of ports. The completion [Ĉ ] of a collectionĈ is the union of all machines ofĈ and the buffers needed for every channel. A port of a collection is called free if its connecting port is not in the collection. These ports will be connected to the users and the adversary. The free ports of a completion [Ĉ ] are denoted as free([Ĉ ]). A collectionĈ is called closed if its completion [Ĉ ] has no free ports except a special master clock-in port clk ⊳ ?. A closed collection represents a "runnable" system and a probability space of runs (sometimes called traces or executions) is defined for it. Machines switch sequentially, i.e., we have exactly one active machine M at any time. If this machine has clock outports, it can select the next message to be delivered by scheduling a buffer via one of these clock out-ports. If the buffer contains a message at the selected position, it delivers this message, and the receiving machine is the next active machine. If M tries to schedule multiple messages, only one is taken, and if it schedules none or the message does not exist, the master scheduler X becomes active. Formally, runs are defined as follows. 
Definition 2. (Runs and Views

Security-specific System Model
We now define specific collections for security purposes. We start with the definition of structures. Intuitively, these are the machines that execute a security protocol. They have a distinguished set of service ports. This is a subset of the free ports where, intuitively, a certain service is guaranteed, while remaining free ports are meant only for the adversary. Typical examples of inputs at service ports are "send message m to participant id " for a message transmission system or "pay amount x to participant id " for a payment system, while typical non-service ports are those of insecure network connections in a real system. For cryptographic purposes, the initial state of all machines in a structure is a security parameter k in unary representation. Forbidden ports for users of a structure are those that clash with port names of given machines and those that would link the user to a non-service port.
Definition 3. (Structures and Service
Definition 4. (Forbidden Ports) For a structure
A system is a set of structures. The idea behind systems is that there may be different actual structures depending on the set of actually malicious participants.
Definition 5. (Systems) A system Sys is a set of structures. 3
A structure can be complemented to a configuration by adding a user machine and an adversary machine. The user is restricted to connecting to the service ports. The adversary closes the collection, i.e., it connects to the remaining service ports, the other free portsSM of the collection, and the free ports of the user. Thus, user and adversary can interact, e.g., for modeling active attacks.
where 
Parametrized Systems
In many typical systems, the structures only depend on the trust model, but not on the security parameter k. In a parametrized system this is different. Hence such a system is partitioned into different subsystems for different values of k. "Normal" systems can naturally be identified with parametrized systems where all subsystems are equal.
Definition 7. (Parametrized Systems)
A parametrized system is a system Sys together with a partitioning (Sys k ) k∈N , i.e., the elements Sys k are pairwise disjoint systems with Sys = k∈N Sys k . In slight abuse of notation we also call the sequence of partitions Sys, and if the system is called Sys, the notation Sys k always refers to the k-th element in the partition sequence.
A bounding function for a parametrized system is a function P such that for all k ∈ N and (M , S ) ∈ Sys k we have |M | ≤ P (k) and the runtime of every M ∈M on initial input 1 k is bounded by P (k) in the sense of circuit complexity (more precisely, circuit size). A parametrized system is polynomial-time if it has a polynomial bounding function.
3
Circuit complexity, i.e., non-uniform complexity, is natural for this definition because one can consider every machine M, used only for security parameter k, as a separate circuit. Meaningful uniform complexity for such a definition requires a universal machine that simulates all these structures, and a generation algorithm for structures. However, our results are reductions with concrete security (as first introduced as a general concept with special notation in [8] ), and usable for a wide range of complexity measures. In those reductions we actually work with Turing complexity because it is defined in full detail for our interacting machines. A parametrized system considers the potentially used subsystems as potentially available from the start. This is also implicitly the case in [10] because although a subsystem is said to be generated there, it springs up magically in distributed locations by this operation. This means that all the connections must be assumed to be predefined. A truly dynamic system would need to distribute port or machine names of new machines, like the π-calculus does. We do not see any specific reason while our theorem should not hold for this case but it would require a rigorous definition first.
We now define user and adversary of a parametrized system.
Definition 8. (User and Adversary of a Parametrized System) A user and an adversary of a parametrized system Sys are families
To reason about the complexity of users and adversaries, or more generally families of machines, we define the parametrized complexity.
Definition 9.
(Parametrized Complexity) Let X = k∈N X k be a partitioned index set (with the same conventions as for systems) and let A = (A x ) x∈X be a family of machines with {1} * ⊆ Ini Ax for every x ∈ X. We say that A is of complexity t : N → N if for all x ∈ X k , the runtime of A x on initial input 1 k is bounded by t(k) in the sense of circuit complexity. We sometimes write t A for "the" complexity of A. 3
Defining Security with Simulatability
Reactive simulatability essentially means that whatever might happen to an honest user in a real system Sys 1 can also happen in an ideal system Sys 2 . More precisely, for every configuration conf 1 of Sys 1 , there exists a configuration conf 2 of Sys 2 with the same user yielding indistinguishable views for this user. A typical situation is illustrated in Figure 2 . However, we do not want to compare a structure of Sys 1 with arbitrary structures of Sys 2 , but only with certain suitable ones. What suitable means in a concrete situation can be defined by a mapping f from Sys 1 to Sys 2 . The mapping f is called valid if it maps structures with the same service ports, so that the same user can connect.
Definition 10. (Valid Mappings)
A valid mapping between two systems Sys 1 and Sys 2 is a function f : S 1 ) ) the corresponding structure of (M 1 , S 1 ). If the systems are parametrized, we also require f (Sys 1,k ) ⊆ Sys 2,k for all k ∈ N. 3
A technical problem for reactive simulatability is that a correct user of a structure from Sys 1 might have forbidden ports in the corresponding structure. Configurations where this does not happen are called suitable; we restrict the simulatability definition to those. We omit a rigorous definition for brevity. For a valid mapping f : Sys 1 → Sys 2 , let Conf f (Sys 1 ) be the set of suitable configurations. We present the definition of indistinguishability for two families of random variables with a common partitioned index set and with versions for concrete security, following [34, 7, 12] . Definition 11. (Indistinguishability) Let two families (var x ) x∈X and (var ′ x ) x∈X of discrete probability distributions (random variables) on common domains (D x ) x∈X be given with a partitioned index set X = k∈N X k (with the same conventions as for systems).
-They are called perfectly indistinguishable iff var
, and x ∈ X k iff its complexity is at most t and
-The distributions are called polynomially indistinguishable iff for all polynomials t and all distinguishers (Dis x ) x∈X with complexity t in their first parameter, there exists a negligible function δ such that δ Dis x ≤ δ(k) for all k and all x ∈ X k .
3
We write "≈ y " for indistinguishability with y = perf, δ, or poly, respectively. We write "≈" if we want to treat all cases together, and we often write "=" for "≈ perf ". We later need that indistinguishability of families of random variables implies indistinguishability of functions of them, e.g., of "parts" of the random variables.
Lemma 1. (Indistinguishability of Derived Distributions) Let var, var
′ be families of probability distributions with partitioned index set X and a common family of domains D, and let φ = (φ x ) x∈X be a family of functions φ x on D x (to strings, but encoding domains as strings is not made explicit). Then the following holds: 
2
This is clear for the perfect case, and can be easily shown by computations on statistical distances for the statistical case. For concrete complexity and the computational case, the distinguisher family Dis for the original distributions is defined by Dis x (1 k , v) := Dis φ,x (1 k , φ(v)) for all k and x ∈ X k , and for v of length at most b(k). We are now ready to define reactive simulatability for parametrized systems. We require that there exists an extension f C of the valid structure mapping f to a configuration mapping that leaves the user unchanged, i.e., we skolemize the existence of corresponding adversaries in Figure 2 . We then consider the families of user views view conf 1 (H) and view f C (conf 1 ) (H) where all machines have initial input 1 k for the security parameter k to which this configuration belongs. Each of these two families contains one well-defined probability distribution for each configuration conf 1 . Overall these are two families of distributions with the partitioned index set Conf f (Sys 1 ) = k∈N Conf f (Sys 1,k ) . Similarly, we obtain two families view conf 1 ,l (H) and view f C (conf 1 ),l (H) for l-step prefixes of user views. 
e) y = poly and y ′ = "polynomially" iff for all users H and adversary A of polynomial complexity, the views (view (M ,S ,H
are polynomially indistinguishable and f C is a P -mapping for a polynomial P .
Universal simulatability means that f C (conf 1 ).A (i.e., A 2 in Figure 2) Where the difference between the types of security is irrelevant, we only write ≥ f sec , and we omit the indices f and sec if they are clear from the context. An essential ingredient in the composition theorem and other uses of the model is a notion of combining several machines into one, and a lemma that this makes no essential difference in views. The combination is defined in a canonical way by considering a combined state space and letting each transition function operate on its respective part. We omit details for brevity. The combination of a setM of machines is written comb(M ) and we sometimes write comb(M 1 , . . . , M j ) for comb({M 1 , . . . , M j }).
Lemma 2. (Machine Combination) LetĈ be a collection without buffers, andD ⊆Ĉ . The view of every set of original machines in (Ĉ \D ) ∪ {comb(D )} is the same as inĈ . This includes the view of the submachines in comb(D ), which is well-defined givenĈ andD. The Turing complexity of comb(D) is the sum of the complexities of the machines in comb(D ). 2
We can now add the notion of blackbox simulatability to Definition 12. Here A 2 is given as the combination of a fixed "simulator" Sim and a machine A 
. For computational security, we require that Sim is polynomial-time, i.e., that the parametrized complexity of (f Sim ((M 1 , S ) 
Composition
When composing several systems, one typically does not want to compose every structure of one system with every structure of the others, but only with certain matching ones. For instance, if the individual machines of Sys 2 are implemented on the same physical devices as those of Sys 1 , as usual in a layered distributed system, we only compose structures corresponding to the same set of corrupted physical devices. However, this is not the only conceivable situation. Hence we do not define a composition operator that produces one specific composition, but a set of possible compositions.
Definition 14. (Composability and Composition of Structures) We call structures
We then define their composition as
We now define the composition of variably many systems, i.e., there is a potentially infinite supply of systems from which a finite number P (k) is chosen for composition for each security parameter k.
Definition 15. (Parametrized Composition of Systems)
Let a sequence Sysseq = (Sys (i) ) i∈N be given where each Sys (i) is a parametrized system, and let P : N → N be a function. Then a P -sized composition of Sysseq is a parametrized system Sys * where for all k ∈ N, every structure (M * , S * ) ∈ Sys * k has a unique representation
If the systems Sys (i) have a joint bounding function Q, then P ·Q is a bounding function for Sys * . In particular, if P and Q are polynomials, then Sys * is polynomial-time.
General Composition Theorem for Blackbox Simulatability
In this section, we show that reactive blackbox simulatability is consistent with the composition of a parametrized number of systems, in particular polynomially many in the computational case. The basic idea is the following: Assume that we have proven that a potentially infinite supply of systems Sys (i) are as secure as systems Sys ′(i) in the sense of black-box simulatability. Now we want to use Sys (i) as a secure replacement for Sys ′(i) , i.e., as an implementation of the ideal system Sys ′(i) . The following theorem shows that such modular proofs are possible. The situation is shown in the upper part of Figure 3 .
Additional conditions in the theorem are that all corresponding structures are composable and that, for the polynomial case, the security of the system is in certain sense uniform. 
and let
exists and lies in Sys 
The first statement to be proved is extracted into the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the mapping f
# is a valid mapping between Sys # and Sys * . 2
The proof is straightforward as in [30] , but heavy on notation. Hence we omit it in this short version. Recall that blackbox simulatability was defined by a function that selects one fixed simulator for each structure (Definition 13).
Definition 16. (Simulator and Corresponding Configurations) Under the conditions of Theorem 1 and for all
Sim and f
(i)
A be the simulator and renaming functions from which f 
A by the equations in Definition 13 (blackbox simulatability). 3
The complexity t Sim of the simulator is t Sim (k) =
In the polynomial case, there exists a polynomial Q Sim such that
We also omit the technical proof that indeed f
It is nevertheless interesting that these proof parts that verify the compatibility of channels and the difference of service ports and adversary ports in compositions make up the major part of a rigorous proof, while the cryptographic aspects are shorter and more standard. Now we can concentrate on proving that the simulator simulates correctly. The proof consists of a hybrid argument as first used in [15] , i.e., we construct intermediate configurations that differ only in the machines of one system. 
Proof (Theorem 1). Let a configuration conf
4. We show that this implies indistinguishability between first and last elements.
We now explain these steps in more detail.
Step 1: For i = 1, . . . , P (k), let the machine collection for the i-th hybrid user beĤ i := {H} ∪ 1≤j<iM
A (A i ). Then we define the hybrid configurations as
For the computational case, we have to show that the family of H hyb i is polynomial-time. This holds since t H hyb i ≤ t H + t Sim + tM # + tM * by Lemma 2, where each addend is polynomially bounded by assumption.
Step 2: We have to show that conf 
i.e., these are indistinguishable configurations under the given blackbox simulatability between Sys (i) and Sys ′(i) .
Step 3: The configurations conf 
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , P (k)}, and similarly
Step 4: We now distinguish the type of the given simulatability relations 
With Lemma 1 this gives
where the l i are sufficiently large numbers to ensure that the l-step prefix of the view of H in conf 
as desired. For concrete complexity and for a (t, ∆ Dis )-distinguisher Dis, we have by definition
We abbreviate q # := Pr(Dis(1 k , view conf # (H)) = 1) and q * := Pr(Dis(1 k , view conf * (H)) = 1), and
(H)) = 1) and q
(H)) = 1) for all i, and (2) and (3) yield
This implies that there exists some i with
We can now consider Dis as a (t, ∆ i )-distinguisher Dis is bounded by b = t H + tM # + tM * + t Sim , and above we showed t Sim ≤ P · Q Sim . The length of runs and thus views in our current representation is bounded by the square of this complexity (but this might be improvable by tighter encoding). This yields the desired polynomial bound b ′ (k) independent of the adversary complexity. For polynomial simulatability, let H, A be a user and an adversary for Sys # of complexity t H and t A , and let t be a polynomial and Dis a distinguisher family of complexity t. Then the functions t H hyb i , t i , and t Ai = t A are polynomials. By assumption, there exists a negligible function δ that uniformly bounds the advantage of distinguishers for the given system pairs for the complexity function max(t i , t H hyb i , t Ai ). Now let a configura- S ) ) be given. The concrete security considerations and Equation (1) imply ∆ i = δ
is negligible. This proves the desired polynomial indistinguishability of the families of user views over Sys # and Sys * .
From Black-Box to Universal Simulatability
We now show a relation between universal simulatability and black-box simulatability. It allows us to apply our general composition theorem to universal simulatability under reasonable assumptions, but it also is of independent interest. More precisely, we show that universal simulatability for two parametrized systems Sys 1 and Sys 2 is equivalent to black-box simulatability if Sys 1 fulfills the following structural requirements: Whenever a clock-out port of a structure (M 1 , S 1 ) ∈ Sys 1 is contained inS c 1 , then so is either the corresponding input or output port. This means that the adversary is not allowed to schedule messages of a connection where it is neither the sender nor the recipient. This condition is naturally fulfilled for insecure channels, since the adversary is inserted between the connections of two machines of the system. Proof. The left-to-right direction is clear by definition. The difficult direction is to show that universal simulatability implies black-box simulatability. Due to lack of space, we can only present a short sketch. This direction essentially consists of four steps:
1. Let a configuration conf 1 = (M 1 , S , H, A 1 ) of the sub-system Sys 1,k be given. We first derive another configuration conf uni 1 = (M 1 , S , H uni , A ′ 1 ) of Sys 1 as follows: We insert a machine TS P ,b,k , called transparent scheduler, into the connections between A 1 and the simple ports inS 1 . It forwards messages between machines of the structure and the adversary. Its parameters P and b correspond to the ports that the transparent scheduler connects to and a bound on its runtime, which is the joint runtime of the machines inM 1 . This machine only depends onM 1 , S , and k. The new user is the combination H uni := comb(H, A 1 ), and the new adversary is A ′ 1 := TS P ,b,k . We show that the views of both H and A 1 are identical in the two configurations. 2. We now show that conf 3. We obtain a configuration conf 2 with the original user and a simulator from conf uni 2 by reversing the combination of H and A 1 into H uni , and by defining the simulator as Sim := A 2 . We show that this does not affect the view of H. 4. Combining several equalities between views of H in different configurations and one indistinguishability gives the same class of indistinguishability.
Summarized statements follow from this treatment per configuration, i.e., with concrete security (although details are omitted here), as usual.
